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In this paper, we explore the possibility that machine learning approaches to natural-
language processing (NLP) being developed in engineering-oriented computational lin-
guistics (CL) may be able to provide speciﬁc scientiﬁc insights into the nature of human
language. We argue that, in principle, machine learning (ML) results could inform basic
debates about language, in one area at least, and that in practice, existing results may
offer initial tentative support for this prospect. Further, results from computational learning
theory can inform arguments carried on within linguistic theory as well.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that the scientiﬁc enterprise of theoretical linguistics on
one hand and the engineering of language applications on the other are separate
endeavors with little to contribute to each other at the moment in the way of
techniques and results. In this paper, we explore the possibility that machine
learning approaches to natural-language processing (NLP) being developed in
engineering-oriented computational linguistics (CL) may be able to provide
speciﬁc scientiﬁc insights into the nature of human language. We argue that,
in principle, machine learning (ML) results could inform basic debates about
language, in one area at least, and that in practice, existing results may offer initial
tentative support for this prospect. Further, results from computational learning
theory can inform arguments carried on within linguistic theory as well.
A basic conundrum of modern linguistic research is the question of how natural
languages can be acquired. It is uncontroversial that the learning of a natural
language(orofanythingelse)requiressomeassumptionsconcerningthestructure
of the phenomena being acquired. So, for example, consider a computer program
that is designed to learn to classify emails as spam or non-spam. One could
assume that spam is identiﬁed by the magnitude of a weighted average over
a set of indicator features fi, each of which speciﬁes whether a given word
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wi appears in the email. We could then use a corpus of email messages, each
marked as to their spam status, to train the weights appropriately. Such a learning
approach(essentiallyperceptronlearningoverthefeatures)assumes(erroneously,
of course, but often effectively) that the phenomenon being investigated, spam
status, is characterizable independently of any properties of the email but those
manifested in the word-existence features, and that their impact on spam status
is strictly linear. Alternatively, some other set of features, method for computing
their combination, and so forth might be used, reﬂecting other assumptions about
the nature of the phenomenon being investigated.
In the ﬁeld of machine learning, the prior structure imputed to the phenomenon
is referred to as the MODEL, which allows for variation in a set of parameters
that may be of different sorts – continuous or discrete, ﬁxed or combinatorial.
Learning algorithms are procedures for setting these parameters on the basis of
samples (OBSERVATIONS) of the phenomenon being acquired. The success of
the algorithm relative to the observations can be veriﬁed by testing to see if it
generalizes correctly to unseen instances of the phenomenon. The role of the
model and algorithm is to provide a learning BIAS.2 In linguistics, this prior
structure is sometimes referred to as UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR (UG), the innate
(that is experientially prior) aspect of the human language endowment that allows
(biases) language acquisition. In the sequel, we will uniformly use the term
LEARNING BIAS for this model or universal grammar aspect.3
It is uncontroversial, because it is deﬁnitional and therefore trivial, that human
language acquisition must have some bias or innate component in this technical
sense.4 There is, however, a nontrivial open question – some would call it the key
question in linguistics – as to the detailed structure of this bias, the NATURE OF
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. Which aspects are derivable from general elements of
cognition and which are task-speciﬁc properties of natural-language acquisition?
In the former case, we might expect simpler models, more uniform in structure,
and in the latter case, structures that are more complex, idiosyncratic, and highly
articulated. A primary point of this paper, however, is that THERE IS NO SUCH
THING AS A NO-BIAS MODEL.
All things being equal, methodological simplicity leads us to prefer an uncom-
plicated, uniform, task-general learning model, which we will term a WEAK-
BIAS model in contrast to STRONG-BIAS models that are highly articulated,
nonuniform, and task-speciﬁc.5 But all things might not be equal. weak-bias
models might not be, and it is often argued are not, sufﬁcient for the purpose of
acquiring linguistic knowledge. Variations of such arguments have been advanced
under the name POVERTY OF THE STIMULUS. They assert that without a certain
task-speciﬁc complexity to the learning bias, the training data are insufﬁcient to
permit acquisition of a model that generalizes appropriately to the full range of
unseen instances of some phenomenon under investigation. It is a predominant
view in linguistics that the complexity of the natural languages that adults speak
requires much of the intricate structure of language to be innate, given the limited
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evidence to which children are exposed. Chomsky (2000: 6–7) summarizes this
view:
A careful look at the interpretation of expressions reveals very
quicklythatfromtheveryearlieststages,thechildknowsvastlymore
than experience has provided. That is true even of simple words.
At peak periods of language growth, a child is acquiring words at
a rate of about one an hour, with extremely limited exposure under
highly ambiguous conditions. The words are understood in delicate
and intricate ways that are far beyond the reach of any dictionary,
and are only beginning to be investigated. When we move beyond
single words, the conclusion becomes even more dramatic. Language
acquisition seems much like the growth of organs generally; it is
something that happens to a child, not that the child does. And while
the environment plainly matters, the general course of development
and the basic features of what emerges are predetermined by the
initial state. But the initial state is a common human possession. It
must be, then, that in their essential properties and even down to ﬁne
detail, languages are cast in the same mold.
An inﬂuential approach to investigating this key question has been to construct
linguistically motivated infrastructures – representations of linguistically oriented
parameters and constraints – that purport to capture universal aspects of language
as proposals for the learning bias. Chomsky (2000: 8) describes this Principles
and Parameters (P&P) model in the following terms:
We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a
ﬁxed network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted
of the principles of language, while the switches are options to be
determined by experience. When switches are set one way, we have
Swahili; when they are set another way, we have Japanese. Each
possible human language is identiﬁed as a particular setting of the
switches – a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. If the
research program succeeds, we should be able literally to deduce
Swahilifromonechoiceofsettings,Japanesefromanother,andsoon
through the languages that humans acquire. The empirical conditions
of language acquisition require that the switches can be set on the
basis of the very limited properties of information that is available to
the child.
We argue that the general machine learning techniques now being used with
some success in engineering-oriented computational linguistics provide an alter-
native approach to this question, and one that could provide quite a different
answer. In particular, to the extent that a given machine learning experiment is
successful in acquiring a particular phenomenon, it shows that the learning bias
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that the model embodies is sufﬁcient for acquisition of that phenomenon. If,
further, the bias is relatively weak, containing few assumptions and little task-
speciﬁcity, the experiment elucidates the key question by showing that arguments
against the model based on its inability to yield the relevant linguistic knowledge
are groundless. (Of course, other arguments against the model might still apply.)
In addition, we argue that theoretical results in machine learning – more
speciﬁcally, results from computational learning theory – give further support for
alternatives to the P&P model. Computational learning theory addresses issues of
learnability under various mathematical assumptions: in particular, it focuses on
whether learning is possible in different scenarios, and on the resources required
for successful learning in terms of computation and number of training examples.
We focus on theoretical results from PAC/VC learning (discussed in section 5),
although similar results are found in models of online learning, and Bayesian
methods. Results from computational learning theory have underpinned much of
the work in more applied machine learning, including research in engineering-
oriented computational linguistics. These results also suggest that the learning
framework implicit in the P&P approach – n ﬁxed, binary parameters – is only
one of a range of plausible deﬁnitions for ‘UG’ or ‘innate bias’, at least if
learnability arguments alone are used to motivate arguments about the nature of
UG.
To summarize, we support the view, which we take to be uncontroversial,
that some form of universal grammar underlies the ability of humans to acquire
language. Where it lies on the scale from weak to strong bias is contentious,
however, and machine learning experiments and theory can clarify that position.
In order to provide pertinent background for our argument, we review the
poverty-of-stimulus argument in section 2. We sketch the basic design of machine
learning systems in section 3. We then show, using parsing as an exemplar
problem,6 how machine learning methods (hence, any experiments based on
them) inherently involve learning biases, that is, claims about the nature of UG,
but we demonstrate that these assumptions can be quite weak, in contrast to the
richly articulated set of structures and conditions that many theoretical linguists
seek to attribute to the initial state of the language acquisition device (section 4).
We ﬁrst look at supervised machine learning in section 4.1, focusing on the work
of Collins (1999) on probabilistic parsing, arguing that much of the success of
these methods is based on distributional bias, as opposed to the categorical bias
assumed in the linguistic literature. Then in section 4.2 we consider recent work
by Klein & Manning (2002, 2004) on unsupervised grammar induction, which
makes even fewer learning bias assumptions than supervised learning.
In addition to empirical work on machine learning for natural-language pro-
cessing, theoretical research can elucidate language acquisition arguments as
well. We summarize pertinent results from computational learning theory in
section 5, highlighting their import for linguistic theorizing. In section 6 we focus
on a number of important distinctions between the concept of parameter current in
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theoretical linguistics on one hand and in probabilistic language modeling on the
other. We suggest that while the former may well be problematic on empirical
grounds, the latter provides a well motivated basis for a weak-bias model of
UG that can, in principle, support a computationally viable theory of language
acquisition.
Finally, in section 7 we discuss the implications of the surprisingly good
performance of machine learning in grammar induction for theories of grammar
and language acquisition. We suggest that arguments from the insufﬁciency of
weak-bias models may not provide motivation for elaborate notions of UG. Most
importantly, however, regardless of the particular conclusions one draws from
the current contingent state of machine-learned linguistic performance, the more
general point remains that results of such experiments could in principle falsify
stimulus-poverty arguments for strong learning bias. In this way at least, the
methods of engineering-oriented computational linguistics can inform theoretical
linguistics.
2. POVERTY-OF-STIMULUS ARGUMENTS FOR A STRONG LEARNING BIAS
Linguists have argued for a highly articulated task-speciﬁc language acquisition
device to account for the speed and efﬁciency with which humans acquire natural
language on the basis of the relevant evidence, regarded intuitively to be sparse.
In our terms this involves assuming a strong learning bias that encodes a rich
set of constraints on the properties of the object to be acquired from the data.
The strong-bias view relies primarily on the poverty-of-stimulus argument to
motivate the claim that a powerful task-speciﬁc bias is required for language
acquisition. According to this argument, the complex linguistic knowledge that
a child achieves within a short time, with very limited data, cannot be explained
through general learning procedures of the kind involved in other cognitive tasks.
The argument can be summarized as follows: There is insufﬁcient evidence
in pertinent language observations to accurately induce a particular general
phenomenon regarding language with a weak-bias learning method alone. The
particular phenomenon appears in language. Therefore, language observations are
not used with a weak-bias learning method alone in inducing the generalization;
strong bias is required. This is, at root, a ‘What else could it be?’ argument.
It asserts that, given the complexity of grammatical knowledge and the lack of
evidence for discerning its properties, we are forced to the conclusion that much
of this knowledge is not learned at all but must already be present in the initial
design of the language learner.
In part, the basis for this claim is the assumption that ﬁrst language learners
have access to very limited amounts of data (the ‘pertinent language observa-
tions’), largely free of negative information (corrections), and thus inadequate
to support inductive projection of grammars under the attested conditions of
acquisition without the assumed bias.
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The claims we make here are independent of the issue of what exactly the data
availabletothelanguagelearnerare.Whatevertheyaredeterminedtobe,machine
learning can potentially be used, as argued below, to support their sufﬁciency for
learning of the pertinent phenomena.
Nonetheless, it is worth digressing to mention that particular aspects of this
view of data poverty have been increasingly subject to challenge. With respect
to the absence of negative data, Chouinard & Clark (2003) provide a detailed
cross linguistic study of several language acquisition corpora in the CHILDES
collection (MacWhinney 1995) suggesting that, in fact, there is a substantial
amount of negative evidence available to children, and this evidence plays a
signiﬁcant role in the acquisition process. They found that in the initial phase
of language learning (2–2.5 years) 50–67% of the child’s errors are explicitly
reformulated by parents into congruent contrast utterances in which the error
is replaced by a correct form. They also show that children attend to these
corrections in a high proportion of cases. Negative evidence greatly facilitates
data-driven grammar induction by signiﬁcantly reducing the search space of
possible rules and constructions. It effectively reduces language acquisition to
an instance of supervised learning. Similarly, contextual information available to
the language learner can, in principle, provide further constraints on the learning
process.
The lack of pertinent data for particular phenomena has also been questioned.
For example, English auxiliary inversion for question formation has previously
been cited (among others, by Crain (1991)) as a phenomenon that could not be
learned from the linguistic data available to the child by virtue of the lack of
exposure to the crucial examples, and so had to be attributed to the bias of the
language acquisition model. Contra this claim, Pullum & Scholz (2002) suggest
that careful examination of the linguistic data to which children are exposed
reveals that it is far richer than poverty-of-stimulus theorists suggest, ﬁnding
attested examples of auxiliary fronting of the sort previously assumed to be
absent.
Further, even if the putatively crucial examples are absent, learning might
still be possible. Scholz & Pullum (to appear), citing work by Lewis & Elman
(2002) observe that when important facts concerning the relative distributional
frequency of certain interrogative forms are factored into the input data, appro-
priate generalizations concerning English question formation can be predicted by
straightforward ML inference techniques.
Clark & Eyraud (2006) propose an algorithm for learning a context free
grammar that handles auxiliary fronting, and sequences of auxiliaries and modals
correctly, where this algorithm can produce the rules of the grammar on the
basis of a very small set of positive data. Here, the only bias is the allowance
for the possibility of hierarchical structure implicit in the choice of context-free
grammars. Whether this bias is language-speciﬁc or not is controversial; in any
case, even if thought to be language-speciﬁc, it is quite weak.
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Indeed, the mere possibility of expressing hierarchical structure in a grammar
does not guarantee its utility. Nonetheless, Perfors et al. (2006) demonstrate
that the posterior probability of a simple hierarchical grammar exceeds that
of a regular (that is, nonhierarchical) grammar of similar coverage. This again
‘suggests that there may be sufﬁcient evidence in the input for an ideal rational
learner to conclude that language is structure-dependent without having an innate
language-speciﬁc bias to do so.’
To summarize the digression, claims that the data available to a language
learner are missing crucial instances (negative data, critical pairs) may be prema-
ture. Nonetheless, as noted above, our claim about the potential for ML methods
to clarify the status of poverty-of-stimulus arguments is independent of the exact
nature of the evidence.
It is important to distinguish poverty of stimulus from other sorts of arguments
that might be advanced in favor of a particular theory of grammar. One might,
for example, argue that a proposed system of grammar provides the best theory
for capturing the syntactic (and other grammatical) relations exhibited by phrases
and sentences in a language, or across languages. Such a theory is motivated by its
coverage of the observed properties of a language or a set of languages.7 Alterna-
tively, one might argue for a given theory of grammar on the basis of consistency
with psycholinguistic results concerning adult processing of language. However,
the components of the theory need not be included in the bias of the language
acquisition model unless they cannot be projected from the input data on the
basis of a weaker bias. It is necessary to motivate a claim of irreducibility of
this sort through independent (non-)learnability evidence for the conditions of the
grammar.
3. REVIEW OF MACHINE LEARNING
Engineering-oriented computational linguistics is the study of methods for the
construction or improvement of useful artifacts that manipulate natural language.
Examples of such artifacts include speech recognizers, machine translation sys-
tems, natural-language interfaces to databases or software systems, and informa-
tion retrieval systems.
A relatively standard approach has emerged for dealing with many of the
problems that arise in this area. A phenomenon is characterized as a function
from some inputs to outputs: speech signals to natural language transcriptions
(speech recognition), English sentences to their labeled bracketings (parsing),
French sentences to English translations (machine translation), Hebrew text to
Hebrew text annotated with vowel diacritics (diacritic restoration), and so on. A
large sample (corpus) of the function is collected, consisting of sampled inputs
with corresponding outputs. The corpus is taken as a benchmark of correctness
for determining the function. It is divided into two subsets, a TRAINING SET and
a TEST SET.
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A parameterized model characterizing a HYPOTHESIS SPACE of possible
functions is designed. A LEARNING ALGORITHM is applied to select one instance
of this space by setting the parameters on the basis of the training set. The
particular instance that is selected deﬁnes the learned function.8
The success of learning is measured by testing the function on the test set.
To the extent that the outputs of the learned function resemble the test samples’
annotatedoutputs,thelearningalgorithmhassuccessfullygeneralizedthetraining
samples. Resemblance can be speciﬁed in various ways. If we require identity
between the output of the learned function and the benchmark, the percentage of
the test set for which identity does not hold is the ERROR RATE. This condition
gives a particularly stringent metric of similarity. More liberal notions than strict
identity are frequently invoked to obtain more realistic measures of the similarity
between the learning algorithm’s outputs and the training set gold standard. The
details are inessential.
Suppose for example that the phenomenon to be characterized is English
grammaticality. It can be characterized as a function from strings to an output
bit that speciﬁes whether the string is or is not grammatical. A corpus of such
a function might, in general, be difﬁcult to acquire, but a sample of positive
instances can be easily generated by taking a corpus of English text. All the
elements are strings that map to the ‘grammatical’ bit value. We use this corpus as
the training set; other examples of grammatical and ungrammatical text can then
serve as a test set.
There are many possible models and learning algorithms that we could use
to learn this function. One particularly simple one is the n-th order markov
model, discussed, inter alia, by Shannon (1948). A probability distribution over
the strings of a language can be characterized as the product of conditional
probabilities:
P(w1···wc) =
c
∏
i=1
P(wi | w1···wi−1) .
We can approximate these conditional probabilities by assuming that each word
is conditionally independent of those occurring n or more words earlier given the
intervening (n−1)-word context.
P(wi | w1···wi−1) ≈ P(wi | wi−n+1···wi−1)
We then take the space of possible functions to be those characterized by a
parameter for each such conditional probability, one for each n-gram (sequence
of n words) in the language, together with a single threshold probability to
differentiate strings as grammatical (above the threshold) or ungrammatical
(below the threshold). In particular, we associate with each n-gram w1···wn the
probability that its ﬁnal word wn occurs in the context of the initial n−1 words.
This probability P(wn | w1···wn−1) can be estimated from the training corpus in
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many ways, most simply by the MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATOR (MLE):
P(wn | w1···wn−1) ≈
c(w1···wn)
c(w1···wn−1)
where c(w1···wk) is the count in the training sample of occurrences of the k-
gram w1···wk. The probability of a new sentence can then be estimated by
multiplying these conditional probabilities for each of the overlapping n-grams in
thesentence,andtheoutputbitcanbedeterminedbythresholdingthisprobability.
Such a reduction of grammaticality to sufﬁcient probability is appealing in its
simplicity even if dramatic in its naivete.
An apparent problem with this approach, noted as early as Syntactic Structures
(Chomsky 1957), is that it inherently fails to distinguish between sentences that
are ungrammatical and those that are infelicitous. The two strings
(1) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.
likely have identical estimated probabilities (or at least did before 1957) for any n-
gram MLE estimated model. For n=1, they contain the same unigrams, hence the
same product. For n>1, they each contain at least one n-gram (and perhaps more)
that would be unattested in any (pre-1957) training corpus. The MLE estimate for
the probability of such unattested n-grams is 0, making the product probability
for both sentences 0 as well, and therefore identical. Thus, there is no value for n
for which such nonsense sentences and non-sentences can be distinguished.
This may be, and in Chomsky’s case was, taken to be an argument against
the possibility of statistical learning of grammaticality judgments. Chomsky
(1957: 17, fn. 4) states
One might seek to develop a more elaborate relation between statisti-
cal and syntactic structure than the simple order of approximation
model we have rejected. I would certainly not care to argue that
any such relation is unthinkable, but I know of no suggestion to
this effect that does not have obvious ﬂaws. Notice, in particular,
that for any n, we can ﬁnd a string whose ﬁrst n words may occur
as the beginning of a grammatical sentence S1 and whose last n
words may occur as the ending of some grammatical sentence S2,
but where S1 must be distinct from S2. For example, consider the
sequences of the form ‘the man who ... are here’, where ... may be a
verb phrase of arbitrary length. Notice also that we can have new but
perfectly grammatical sequences of word classes, e.g., a sequence of
adjectives longer than any ever produced in the context ‘I saw a –
house’. Various attempts to explain the grammatical-ungrammatical
distinction, as in the case of (1), (2), on the basis of frequency of
sentence type, order of approximation of word class sequences, etc.,
will run afoul of numerous facts like these.
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But in fact the argument shows no more than that the simple MLE n-gram
approach to the task fails. It has long been known that MLE estimates can
overﬁt, underestimating the probabilities of events rare or absent in the training
data. Methods for overcoming the problem go under the rubric of SMOOTHING.
Pereira (2000) points out that smoothing techniques, introduced by Good (1953),
permit the assignment of probability values to unobserved linguistic events. When
enriched with smoothing, statistical modeling of NL learning can deal effectively
with sparse data. Pereira shows that a smoothed bigram model actually provides
a FIVE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE difference in probability for these two sentences.
Importantly, Pereira’s smoothed model has far fewer parameters than the MLE
bigram model. Fewer parameters are needed in this case by virtue of the greater
bias implicit in the model.9 In particular, the model instantiates the claim that the
probability of a word depends not on the identity of the prior word as in a bigram
modelbutonits CLASS,and,contrarytoChomsky(1957)’sclaim,thismodeldoes
predict a signiﬁcant distinction in probability between the two example sentences.
Pereira uses the following alternative bigram approximation:
P(wi | wi−1) ≈∑
c
P(wi | c)P(c | wi−1) .
(Since instances of these further probabilities P(wi | c) and P(c | wi) are not
directly observed, we can no longer use simple observed frequencies, but other
general statistical procedures sufﬁce for inducing these parameters.)
However, no stipulation is made as to the set of classes or the class of
particular words; these are learned from the training data simultaneously with the
class-based bigram parameters. The smoothed model manifests a linguistically
motivated bias, namely the uncontroversial claim that WORDS FORM DISTRI-
BUTIONAL PATTERNS BY VIRTUE OF FALLING INTO CLASSES. The surprising
fact is that such an impoverished bit of additional bias has such far-reaching
consequences for a learning method to capture important linguistic phenomena.
There are three lessons here. First, the inapplicability of one weak-bias learning
method does not rule out all such methods. Though MLE n-grams cannot
distinguishthetwosentences,littleadditionalbiasisneededforalearningmethod
to achieve this effect, and that bias seems hardly language-speciﬁc.
Second, the applicability of a weak-bias learning method does not guarantee
its general adequacy. To forestall confusion, we emphasize that thresholded
smoothed n-gram models of the type Pereira uses in his example are completely
implausible as a model of language on many grounds – empirical coverage,
descriptive complexity, appropriateness for interpretation, among others. No one
would argue that they can completely characterize grammaticality. The inade-
quacy of the model is immaterial to our point, which is simply to show that there
is sufﬁcient information in the corpus of data to learn a distinction between these
sentences that are putatively indistinguishable without language-speciﬁc bias. We
must look for evidence for the language structure for the sentences in question
from some other source. But this case does indicate that information-theoretic
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approaches to modeling grammar are not vulnerable to the simple arguments for
rich innate structure that have been widely accepted in the linguistics literature
for the past forty-ﬁve years.
Finally, and most importantly, all machine learning methods introduce bias.
Even the n-gram model, paradigmatic of a weak-bias language modeling method,
makes the assumption that words more than n words apart are conditionally
independent. Indeed, without bias, there is no generalization, and generalization
is the OBJECT of learning.
4. WEAKLY BIASED MACHINE LEARNING METHODS FOR PARSING
To illustrate our claim that machine learning methods can, in principle, provide
linguistic insight, we consider parsing, the recovery of the hierarchical syntactic
structure of a sentence. Discussing a speciﬁc natural-language task allows us to
highlight the important properties of machine learning that bear on the issues at
hand: the distinction between supervised and unsupervised methods, the implicit
grounding of all methods in a linguistic theory however impoverished, and the
explicit ability to determine appropriate generalization to new data.
To test if a system (including a person) can parse, we need to compare
the performance of the system against correct parses of sentences. Of course,
what constitutes a correct parse is a theory-relative notion. For concreteness,
we use a proxy for real parsing, namely, replicating the parses of the Penn
Treebank (Marcus 1993). Recall that machine learning methods involve inducing
an approximation of a function. The function at hand here, then, is the function
from a string to its syntactic analysis as given in the Treebank. We use the
Treebank itself for both training and testing samples.
As we noted in section 3 we can use different similarity measures to evaluate
the performance of a learning algorithm, in this case a grammar induction system
for parsing, against a gold standard. Requiring only consistency of bracketing
of the parser’s output relative to the annotated structure of the corpus yields
the NON-CROSSING-BRACKETS RATE metric. Many other possibilities have been
proposed (Goodman 1996). We will measure the quality of the approximation via
F-MEASURE, a weighted combination of precision and recall over constituents
(labeled brackets).10 Such a measure tracks how often the reconstructed brackets
are correct and how often the correct brackets are reconstructed,with performance
ranging from zero (worst) to one (best), and often expressed as a percentage.11
If the observations on which the system is trained include input (the sample
strings) annotated with the intended parse (that is, their benchmark output
structure), the learning task is SUPERVISED. (One can imagine a supervisor or
teacher telling the student the right answer for each training problem.) When
the observations include only the input, but not the output, the learning is
UNSUPERVISED.
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4.1 Supervised learning of parsing
Thespaceofallparametersettingsinthemodelforgrammarinductiondetermines
the hypothesis space of learnable parsers. This space determines the expressivity
ofthelearnedmodelandsospeciﬁesanimportantpartofitsbias.Inthelinguistics
literature, the bias induced by the parameter structure of the grammar has been
thought of categorically, that is, as governing what is or is not a possible language.
It is also quite possible, and frequently beneﬁcial, to introduce distributional bias
into the model, that is, the speciﬁcation of an a priori probability distribution over
the hypothesis space, and hence over the possible languages. (We will make this
notion of distributional bias more precise in section 5.4.)
The notion of distributional bias, in contrast to categorical bias, has not been
widely used in linguistics. A distributional bias does not directly limit the class
of languages that are learnable, but rather affects the likelihood with which a
particular language will be chosen to generalize the observations (or the amount
of evidence required to select a particular language). A simple example may
clarify the idea. Suppose we want to learn how many sides are on a multi-sided
sequentially numbered die based on observations of rolls. We select an inﬁnite
hypothesis space of possibilities in which all die sizes are possible. One model
might assume that all numbers of sides are equally likely a priori; another might
assume that dice tend to have about six sides, with more or fewer being less likely
the farther from this norm. Then, after seeing a certain set of observations, say 2,
4, 1, 3, 2, the most likely number of sides under the ﬁrst (uniform) model would
be 4, but under the second (nonuniform model) it might be 5. Categorical bias can
be seen as a limit case of distributional bias where the distribution assigns zero
probability to certain elements of the hypothesis space.
Indeed, the two kinds of bias can be measured on the same scale, representing
the dimensionality of the learning problem. Distributional bias can be effective in
allowinglearning,evenwithoutrestrictingtheclassofpossiblelearnedlanguages.
This is in contrast to the assumption, sometimes found in the linguistics literature,
that without a categorical constraint on the class of languages, perhaps even
reducing it to a ﬁnite set, learning cannot succeed.
By way of example of the weak linguistically-oriented bias found in current
engineering-oriented models, and the power of distributional bias, we consider
the sequence of parsers built by Collins (1999). As described above, the problem
at issue is the reconstruction of a syntactic analysis from samples. We must
assume, of course, that strings have structure; this is implicit in the statement
of the problem. Beyond that, all else is bias. For instance, we can assume that
the probabilities for the expansion of a node are completely random, making
no assumptions as to their distribution. In that case, no generalization from the
training data is possible. In order to get started, let us assume that the constituents
that we see are representative of the function outputs in at least the following
way: the phrase types (nonterminal labels N) are generated according to a ﬁxed
distribution P(N). With this assumption, we can use the training data to learn an
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approximation of the distribution in a variety of ways. The maximum likelihood
estimate is merely the observed probability in the training sample. Generating
trees in this way corresponds to selecting a random tree structure and decorating
it with labels according to this ﬁxed distribution. This would undoubtedly work
better than nothing at all, though not much.
The normal starting point for statistical parsing models, therefore, conditions
the probability of a child nonterminal sequence on that of the parent. We have
conditional probabilities of the form P(X1···Xn | N) for each nonterminal N and
sequence X1···Xn of items from the vocabulary of the grammar (the nonterminals
plus the words of the language). We also need a probability distribution over the
label of the root of the tree Ps(N). We can then learn these parameters from a
training corpus, perhaps by MLE. By structuring the model in this way, we are
assuming that the trees were generated by a probabilistic context-free grammar
(PCFG). The conditional probabilities P(X1···Xn | N) correspond to probabilistic
parameters that govern the expansion of a node in a parse tree according to a
context free rule N → X1···Xn. (Because the languages generable by context-
free grammars are limited, the hypothesis space of this model must be limited as
well; this part of the bias is categorical.) Such models work poorly, if passably,
as statistical parsers. Systems built in this way show F-measures in the low 0.7
range, that is, there is a match of about 70% between the constituents of the gold
standard and those of trees that the parser generates for the training data.
To improve performance, we need to add either further expressivity or addi-
tional bias by effectively reducing the dimensionality of the problem, and so
removing degrees of freedom in hypothesis selection. We will do both. Further
expressivity is needed in part because the context-freeness assumption implicit
in the model fails to hold – the probability of a child sequence is manifestly
not independent of everything but the parent label. We can further articulate
the distributions in various ways. Collins does so by conditioning on lexical
material, introducing the notion of a head word, and replacing nonterminals with
nonterminal/head pairs in the model. The probability distributions are now of the
form Ps(N/h) and P(X1/h1···H/h···Xn/hn | N/h).
Because this dramatic increase in dimensionality makes the function more
difﬁcult to learn (prone to overﬁtting), we assume that these numerous con-
ditional probabilities themselves have further structure, in particular, that the
head constituent is conditioned only on the parent, and each sibling of the
head constituent is conditioned only on the head, the parent, and the side of
the head on which it falls. These further independence assumptions allow the
probabilities P(X1/h1···H/h···Xn/hn | N/h) to be computed as the product of a
far smaller and simpler set of conditional probabilities. In this way additional bias
is introduced.
Bias could have been introduced through further categorical constraints, by
allowing only certain context-free rules that follow from detailed linguistic
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analysis (equivalently, reducing the number of conditional probability parame-
ters). Instead, we adopt a more conservative approach here (as is characteristic
of engineering-oriented CL), allowing all such rules, but adjusting the prior
distribution of probabilities over them through the structure of parameters of the
previous paragraph.
By proceeding in this way it is possible to construct models with F-measure
performance of approximately 88% (Collins 1999), with more recent work
improving this further to approximately 91% (Charniak & Johnson 2005). This
level of performance is quite impressive, if not yet at the level of human parsing.
Nonetheless, one might wonder to what extent these models can be characterized
as weak-bias methods. They certainly import structure consistent with our under-
standing of language. The design of the models they use encodes the requirements
that sentences have hierarchical (tree) structure, that constituents have heads
which select for their siblings, and that this selection is determined by the head
words of the siblings. However, these conditions on language do not express the
complex view of universal grammar assumed in much of current linguistic theory.
Onemighthavethoughtthatitisnecessarytopositaparametergoverningwhether
complements precede or follow their heads in a given language. In fact, no such
parameter is part of Collins’ model, which still correctly generalizes the relevant
phenomena, while, in principle, allowing analyses in which head-complement
order varies in linguistically unlikely ways.
The point here is that by structuring a statistical parsing model, one is making
claims with linguistic import. But current ML parsers demonstrate the fact that
relatively weak claims may still yield surprisingly strong performance.
At this point one might object that supervised learning has limited relevance
to the problem we are considering, given that the features and structures that
the machine learner acquires are already marked in the training data. In what
sense, then, can supervised learning claim to induce a classiﬁer for the recognition
of complex properties from data through weakly biased models if the data is
already annotated with these properties? There are two points to make in reply
to this objection. First, as we have already noted, recent psycholinguistics studies
of child language acquisition suggest that negative evidence plays a signiﬁcant
role in ﬁrst language learning. This evidence turns the language learning problem
into a species of supervised learning. Second, current research on unsupervised
learning has achieved very promising results for parsing using unsupervised ML
methods. We will brieﬂy describe some of this work next.
4.2 Unsupervised learning of parsing
In unsupervised learning the training corpus is not annotated with the structures
that the system is intended to acquire. Instead the learning algorithm uses
distributional patterns and clustering properties of more basic features in the
training data to project a classiﬁer that recognizes the objects to be learned.
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This is a considerably more difﬁcult task than supervised learning, as it requires
identiﬁcation of a class of target objects without the beneﬁt of prior exposure to
explicit pairings of feature patterns and target objects in the input data.
Advocatesofapoverty-of-stimulusargumentforastronglearningbiasencoded
in a rich set of parameterized linguistic principles have generally characterized
language acquisition as an unsupervised learning problem of a particularly
stringent variety. If it turns out that this problem can be solved by an ML model
with comparatively weak bias, then this result would provide insight into the
nature of the initial conditions (UG) that are sufﬁcient for language acquisition,
even if one discounts the negative evidence that may be available to the human
learner.
Early experiments with unsupervised grammar induction (like those reported
by Carroll & Charniak (1992)) did not yield encouraging results. However, recent
work has shown signiﬁcant progress. The grammar induction system proposed
by Klein & Manning (2002) is an unsupervised method that learns constituent
structure from part of speech (POS) tagged input by assigning probability values
to sequences of tagged elements as constituents in a tree. They bias their model
to parse all sentences with binary branching trees, and they use an Expectation
Maximization (EM) algorithm to identify the most likely tree structure for a
sentence. Their method relies on recognizing (unlabeled) constituents through
distributional clustering of corresponding sequences in the same contexts, where
a tree structure is constrained by the requirement that sister constituents do not
overlap (have non-null intersections of elements).
The Klein and Manning procedure achieves an F-measure of 71% on WALL
STREET JOURNAL (WSJ) text, using Penn Treebank parses as the standard of
evaluation. This score is impressive when one considers a limitation that the
evaluation procedure imposes on their system. The upper bound on a possible
F-measure for their algorithm is 87% because the Penn Treebank assigns non-
binary branching to many constituents. In fact, many of the system’s ‘errors’ are
linguistically viable parses that do not conform to analyses of the Penn Treebank.
So, for example, the Treebank assigns ﬂat structure to NPs, while the Klein and
Manning procedure analyses NPs as having iterated binary branching. Parses of
the latter kind can be motivated on linguistic grounds.
One might object to the claim that Klein and Manning’s parser is genuinely
unsupervised on the grounds that it uses the POS tagging of the Penn Treebank
as input. They run an experiment in which they apply their procedure to WSJ text
annotated by an unsupervised tagger, and obtain an F-measure of 63.2%. How-
ever, as they point out, this tagger is not particularly reliable. Other unsupervised
taggers, like the one that Clark (2003) describes, yield very encouraging results,
and outputs of these taggers might well permit the parser to perform at a level
comparable to that which it achieves with the Penn Treebank tags.
Klein & Manning (2004) describe a probabilistic model for unsupervised learn-
ing of lexicalized head dependency grammars. The system assigns probabilities to
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dependency structures for sentences by estimating the likelihood that each word
in the sentence is a head that takes a speciﬁed sequence of words to its left and
to its right as argument or adjunct dependents. The probabilities are computed on
the basis of the context in which the head appears, where this context consists
of the words (word classes) occurring immediately on either side of it. Like the
constituent structure model, their dependency structure model imposes binary
branching as a condition on trees. The procedure achieves an F-measure of 52.1%
on Penn Treebank test data. This result underrates the success of the dependency
model to the extent that it relies on strict evaluation of the parser’s output against
the dependency structures of the Penn Treebank, in which NPs are headed by N’s.
Klein and Manning report that in many cases their dependency parser identiﬁes
the determiner as the head of the NP, and this analysis is, in fact, linguistically
viable.
Whenthedependencysystemiscombinedwiththeirunsupervisedconstituency
grammar, the integrated model outperforms each of these systems. In the compos-
ite model the score for each tree is computed as the product of the individual
models that the dependency grammar and the constituency structure grammar
generate. This model uses both constituent clustering and the probability of head
dependency relations to predict binary constituent parse structure. It yields an
F-measure of 77.6% with Penn Treebank POS tagging. It also achieves an F-
measure of 72.9% with an unsupervised tagger (Sch¨ utze 1995).
This work on unsupervised grammar induction indicates that it is possible
to learn a grammar that identiﬁes complex syntactic structure with a relatively
high degree of accuracy using a model containing a weak bias, speciﬁcally the
assumption of binary branching, a non-overlap constraint for constituents, and
limited conditions on head argument/adjunct dependency relations.
A criticism might be raised that unsupervised learning does not provide a
credible model of human language acquisition because children acquire their lan-
guage through semi-supervised learning in rich non-linguistic contexts. Neither
supervised nor unsupervised learning from corpora expresses this task. While it
is clearly true that information from extra-linguistic context plays a crucial role in
human language acquisition, the fact that experiments on unsupervised grammar
induction from corpora are beginning to achieve good results is highly relevant to
the issue that we are addressing here. By considering a more restricted learning
problem in which severer conditions are imposed on input and induction than
apply in child language learning, these experiments establish the computational
viability of weak-bias models for the human case, where additional sources and
varieties of learning input are available.
Another criticism that might be raised is that anything short of 100 percent
success fails to establish the credibility of either a supervised or an unsupervised
ML grammar induction device taken as a model for human language acquisition.
To achieve successful coverage of the data not handled by the system one might
require entirely different sorts of learning principles than those that the system
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applies. Taken to its ultimate conclusion this objection also undermines poverty
of stimulus arguments for a richly articulated UG. Unless a theory of strong-
bias UG accounts for all of the properties of natural language and the acquisition
process, then it is subject to the same skepticism. Linguistic theories that leave
some of this data unexplained are in the same position as ML systems that do
not parse all of the corpora on which they are tested. The objection invokes the
possibility that grammar induction, and, in fact, language acquisition in general, is
nonmonotonic in that it might consist of disjoint components deﬁned by entirely
distinct sets of learning methods. In the absence of signiﬁcant evidence for this
possibility, the objection is not compelling. As Hume would say, it admits of no
answer, but produces no conviction.
5. INSIGHTS FROM COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING THEORY
We have argued that empirical results in machine learning applied to natural
language can provide linguistic insight. In this section, we describe how results
from the theoretical branch of machine learning, COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING
THEORY, can inform linguistic theorizing as well.
Computational learning theory provides precise mathematical frameworks for
the analysis of learning problems. The development of this theory has been
central in the analysis of existing algorithms used in machine learning and in the
development of new learning algorithms. Learning theory has provided profound
insights into what can and cannot be learned, and the resources (for example in
terms of computation or the number of training examples) required for learning
under different assumptions.
Arguments of a learning-theoretic nature are sometimes seen in linguistic
theorizing, as for instance claims that restricting the set of possible languages
to a ﬁnite number allows language to be learned, or that eliminating a linguistic
parameter makes the system more learnable, or that the early learning theory
results of Gold (1967), showing the difﬁculty of learning languages under certain
assumptions, demonstrate the need for strong-bias learning.
In this section we argue that recent results from learning theory are highly rel-
evant to language acquisition questions in general, and cast light on these claims
in particular. In particular, we describe how learning theory suggests alternatives
to the P&P model of UG. We will emphasize the following conclusions that can
be drawn from our current understanding of computational learning theory:
• More recent learning frameworks – PAC/VC, online, and Bayesian
learning – should be considered as serious alternatives to Gold’s frame-
work. These methods typically consider rates of convergence, not just
convergence in the limit. They allow models of learning in the presence
of noise. They have been far more successful in practice when analyzing
and developing machine learning methods within applied ﬁelds.
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• Naive counting of parameters is not a useful guide to difﬁculty of learning.
It is possible to learn in inﬁnite dimensional spaces, given the right learning
bias or parameter estimation method. Conversely, some ﬁnite spaces are
too complex (large) for learning with a reasonable number of training
examples.
• Similarly, even for ﬁnite-dimensional spaces, comparing the number of
parameters is not a reasonable method for evaluating the difﬁculty of
learning.
• Learning bias can be embodied both in the deﬁnition of the hypothesis
space and in the learning algorithm. Linguistic arguments have traditionally
concentrated on the former alone.
• There are nontrivial issues in learning of ﬁnite hypothesis spaces: for
example how rates of convergence depend on the size of the hypothesis
space, and how a distributional prior can be deﬁned over elements of the
hypothesis space.
In order to provide backing for these points, we introduce computational
learning theory approaches, describe PAC/VC learning in ﬁnite and inﬁnite
hypothesis spaces, and discuss the crucial role of distributional bias in learning.
5.1 Computational learning theory approaches
Recall that we characterize a phenomenon to be learned as a function from inputs
to outputs. A learning method proposes a hypothesis that is thus such a function.
As outlined earlier, a learning approach consists of two high-level components:
• A HYPOTHESIS SPACE: The set of functions that the learning approach
will consider. For example, in the P&P framework, the hypothesis space
would be the set of all possible grammars under UG. If there are n binary
parameters, and these parameters can be set independently from each other,
the hypothesis space is ﬁnite and is of size 2n. In the remainder of this paper
we will use H to denote a hypothesis space.
• A LEARNING FUNCTION: A function that maps a sequence of training
examples to a member of the hypothesis space H . We will use LEARN
to denote this function.
We can imagine that the learner proceeds by observing a training example
o1 and applying the LEARN function to it, generating a ﬁrst hypothesis h1 =
LEARN(o1). Upon seeing the next observation o2, the learner hypothesizes h2 =
LEARN(o1,o2). In general, after n observations, the learner hypothesizes hn =
LEARN(o1,...,on). Each such hypothesis is a function drawn from the hypothesis
space H , and represented by a setting of the parameters.
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Given these deﬁnitions, the following issues are crucial in determining whether
learning is successful under a particular choice of H and LEARN:
• CONVERGENCE IN THE LIMIT: In the limit, as the number of training
examples goes to inﬁnity, will the learning method ‘converge’ to the correct
member of H ?
• RATE OF CONVERGENCE: If the method does converge, how quickly will
it converge, in terms of the number of training examples required, before
the optimal member of H is settled on?
We argue that both of these questions are critical when assessing the plausibility
of a proposal for language acquisition. Convergence in the limit is a minimal
requirement for any learning method. The rate of convergence is also important,
as it is uncontroversially the case that the number of utterances available to a
human language learner is limited.
The convergence results for a learning approach depend on (in addition to the
deﬁnitions of H and LEARN) two further deﬁnitions: (i) a precise deﬁnition of
convergence; and (ii) the assumptions that are made about the process generating
the training examples. Learning in the limit (Gold 1967) was one of the earliest
proposals for how to frame a theory of learning that follows this general approach.
Since then several other frameworks have been introduced, some prominent
ones being VC theory (Vapnik & Chervonenkis 1971); PAC learning (Valiant
1984); online learning (see Blum (1996) for a survey); and Bayesian methods
(see Berger (1985) for a survey). These methods differ signiﬁcantly from Gold’s
framework, both in terms of their deﬁnitions of convergence and the assumptions
they make about how training examples are generated. In practice this has led
to the development of deﬁnitions of H and LEARN signiﬁcantly different from
those considered within Gold’s approach.
In the framework of Gold (1967), the sequence of training examples can be any
sequence deﬁned by a Turing machine – this sequence is unknown to the learner.
Convergence is deﬁned as the very strict criterion that at some point in any such
sequence LEARN must converge to a state where it continually predicts the correct
member of H .
In PAC/VC learning, by contrast, quite different deﬁnitions of convergence and
data generation are used. A central assumption is that there is some probability
distribution D over examples in the domain, and the training set is a sample of
points drawn randomly from this distribution. A notion of convergence parameter-
ized by two factors, numbers ε and δ between 0 and 1, is deﬁned with respect to
this distribution. Informally speaking, (ε,δ)–convergence means that with high
probability (1−δ), the learning method generates a hypothesis that is close to
(within ε of) the ideal, that is, the hypothesis is PROBABLY APPROXIMATELY
CORRECT (PAC).12 Results from the literature in PAC/VC learning give bounds
on the number of training examples required for (ε,δ)–convergence, or show
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that (ε,δ)–convergence is impossible with a ﬁnite training sample for certain
deﬁnitions of H and/or LEARN.
The PAC notion of convergence is quite natural in the context of language
learning. Neither a guarantee of convergence (δ = 0) nor exact convergence
(ε = 0) are necessary or even plausible for human language acquisition. The
noisiness of actual linguistic behavior, especially at the margins, means that
distinguishing between convergence to an ε of zero versus nonzero may not even
be empirically possible.
Whether convergence is guaranteed within the PAC/VC framework will depend
critically on the choice of the hypothesis space H and the learning function
LEARN. In effect, the choices of H and LEARN implement a substantial bias
in the deﬁnition of a learning method. In the next sections we give a survey of
different proposals for the deﬁnition of H and LEARN, in each case discussing
the consequences for learnability within the PAC/VC framework.
5.2 PAC/VC learning with ﬁnite hypothesis spaces
First, we consider results for PAC/VC learning when the hypothesis space H is
ﬁnite. For now we assume a particularly simple deﬁnition of LEARN: We take
LEARN to return the member of H that makes the smallest number of errors on
the training sample. This deﬁnition of LEARN is often referred to as empirical risk
minimization (ERM) Vapnik (1998).
Within the PAC/VC framework, for ﬁnite hypothesis spaces the ERM method
always leads to a learning method that converges in the limit. The rate of
convergence depends directly on the size of the hypothesis space H . More
precisely, for ﬁxed ε and δ, the number of training examples required scales
linearly with the LOGARITHM of the number of functions within H . Within the
P&P framework, assuming n binary parameters, the size of the hypothesis space
is |H | = 2n; the number of training examples required therefore scales linearly
with log|H | = nlog2.13 The linear dependence on log|H | as opposed to |H |
has important consequences. If the number of training examples required scaled
linearly with 2n then learning within the P&P approach for any signiﬁcantly large
value of n would be completely infeasible.
The most important point here is that the SIZE OF THE HYPOTHESIS SPACE is
the central factor underlying rate of convergence of the learning method. Different
hypothesisspacesthathavethesame size shouldrequireroughlythesamenumber
oftrainingexamplesforlearning.Thisisaveryusefulguidelinewhenconsidering
the viability of alternatives to the P&P approach. As one example, in Optimality
Theory each hypothesis is deﬁned by a ranking of c constraints. The size of the
hypothesisspaceinthiscaseis|H |=c!;thisleadstotheboundlog|H |≤clogc.
When comparing a proposal within the P&P framework with n parameters to an
OT proposal with c constraints, we would expect the complexity of learning to
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be roughly equivalent in the two cases if nlog2 ≈ clogc. In practice, logc grows
slowly as a function of c, so that n and c can be the same order of magnitude.
As a less familiar example, albeit one with clear potential applications, consider
SPARSE PARAMETER REPRESENTATIONS. As in the P&P approach, assume that
each hypothesis is deﬁned by the setting of n binary parameters, but where
only a small number, k, of these parameters are ever set to 1 rather than 0
in the hypothesis returned by LEARN. (Equivalently, we could assume that the
remaining n−k parameters take some default value.) In this case the size of
the hypothesis space is n!
(n−k)!k! ≤ nk. The number of training examples required
scales linearly with log|H | ≤ klogn. The striking property of this representation
is that the number of training examples, while linear in k, depends linearly on
logn rather than n. This means that learning is feasible for very large values for n,
assuming that k is relatively small. To illustrate this, consider a P&P model with
n = 200 parameters, and a hypothesis space which is therefore of size 2200. In
the sparse representation model, values of k = 10 and n = 220 ≈ 1,000,000 lead
to a hypothesis space of size less than 2200. That is, learning in a space deﬁned
by 1,000,000 parameters is no harder than one deﬁned by 200 parameters, if in
the former case we know that only 10 of the parameters take non-default values.
Sparse parameter representations thus provide a simple example showing that
naive counting of parameters is not a reasonable measure of the complexity of
learning.
5.3 PAC/VC learning with inﬁnite hypothesis spaces
Now consider the case where the hypothesis space H is inﬁnite. In particular,
we will assume that each member of H is associated with n REAL-VALUED
parameters. Thus the hypothesis space is uncountably inﬁnite. In this case, the
results of the previous section are clearly not applicable. We will again consider
convergence results for the ERM learning method, where LEARN simply picks the
hypothesis h with the smallest number of errors on the training sample.
In the ERM method for inﬁnite hypothesis spaces, a measure called the VC-
DIMENSION (Vapnik 1998) is critical in determining whether the learning method
converges in the limit, and also in determining the rate of convergence. The VC-
dimension of a hypothesis space H is deﬁned as the largest value of m such that
there is a training sample of size m that is SHATTERED by H . A training sample
is shattered by a hypothesis space H if for each of the 2m possible labelings of
the sample, there is a hypothesis in H that assigns that labeling.14 For example,
suppose that the function to be learned maps points in two-dimensional space
onto 0 and 1. Such a function assigns a single bit to each point in the real plane. A
hypothesis space is a subset of all such possible functions. It might, for instance,
contain just those functions that assign 1s to all points ‘northeast’ or ‘southwest’
of a designated point p in the plane, and 0s to all points in the other two quadrants.
Each element of this ‘northeast-southwest’ hypothesis space is characterized by
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1
The ‘northeast-southwest’ hypothesis space labels points in the northeast and southwest
(gray) quadrants deﬁned by its single point parameter (shown as ‘*’) as 1, and 0 in the
other two (white) quadrants. (a) Two points in the two-dimensional space can be labeled
with all four possible labelings. (Here, we depict a labeling of a point as a 1 or 0 by
showing the point as a ‘+’ symbol or ‘−’ symbol, respectively.) Adding a third point in the
conﬁguration (b) cannot be labeled with the depicted labeling (a 0 surrounded by two 1s),
because (c) any hypothesis that labels the outside points properly captures the inside point.
It can be veriﬁed that no set of three points can be shattered by this hypothesis space. The
hypothesis space thus shatters two points, but not three. The VC-dimension of the space is
therefore 2.
two real-valued parameters, the two coordinates of the designated point p that
picks out the junction between the 1s quadrants and the 0s quadrants. This
hypothesis space (by virtue of its impoverished expressivity) has a VC-dimension
of 2, because it shatters two points, but not three, as depicted in ﬁgure 1.15
A hypothesis space H has inﬁnite VC-dimension if for any value of m, there
is some training sample of size m that is shattered by H . Given these deﬁnitions,
the following results hold: (i) the ERM method converges in thelimit if and only if
the VC-dimension of the hypothesis space is ﬁnite; and (ii) the number of training
examples required is roughly linear in the VC-dimension of the hypothesis space.
There are a number of important points here. First, learning in inﬁnite hypoth-
esis spaces with the ERM method is possible in some cases, more precisely, in
those cases where the hypothesis space has ﬁnite VC-dimension. This in itself is
a surprising result: intuition would suggest that inﬁnite hypothesis spaces might
be too complex for learning to be successful. Second, the VC-dimension will be
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highly sensitive to the precise deﬁnition of the hypothesis space (in contrast to
the results for ﬁnite hypothesis spaces, where merely knowing the size of H was
sufﬁcient to characterize learnability). For example, even though the ‘northeast-
southwest’ hypothesis space is inﬁnite, learning in this space converges quickly
because its VC-dimension is low. A simple linear (hyperplane) classiﬁer with n
parameters has VC-dimension equal to n. The number of training examples will
then scale linearly with the number of parameters in the model. In contrast, it is
possible to deﬁne hypothesis spaces that have a single real-valued parameter, and
yet have inﬁnite VC-dimension and are therefore not learnable through the ERM
method. (Vapnik (1998) provides one such example.)
5.4 PAC/VC learning and distributional bias
Thus far we have considered a relatively simple deﬁnition of LEARN, based on
the ERM principle, where LEARN simply returns the member of H with the
smallest number of errors on the training sample. In this approach, the only
form of learning bias comes in the choice of H . We now consider a powerful
generalization of this method, where a DISTRIBUTIONAL BIAS over the members
of H can be used by LEARN.
We provide an example of this method for ﬁnite hypothesis spaces. Consider
the following deﬁnition of LEARN. In addition to H , we assume that the learning
algorithm has access to some probability distribution P(h) over the members of
H . The distribution P(h) can be arbitrary, the only restriction being that it must
be chosen independently of the training examples. We now consider a modiﬁed
deﬁnition of LEARN. The function LEARN returns a hypothesis h in H that
attempts to simultaneously minimize two factors: the number of errors that the
function makes on the training sample (as for the ERM method), which we call
ERROR0(h), and the negative log probability −logP(h) of the hypothesis. The
formerquantityis,asbefore,ameasureofhowwellthehypothesisﬁtsthetraining
sample. The latter quantity is a measure of the ‘complexity’ of the hypothesis h,
phrased in terms of a penalty for choosing an unlikely h. When P(h) is 1, the
penalty is 0 (since log1 = 0). As P(h) decreases to 0, the penalty increases to
inﬁnity.16
Intuitively, P(h) will assign an a priori bias towards choosing or not choosing
h in the learning process. In particular, a higher value of P(h) reﬂects a stronger
bias towards choosing h as the output of LEARN. As for the ERM method, it
can be shown that the method described above converges in the limit. However,
the analysis of the RATE OF CONVERGENCE is different from that of the ERM
method. If the correct hypothesis h has a relatively high value for P(h) – in other
words, if the a priori bias is well-tuned to the learning problem in that it places
high weight on the correct member of H – then convergence can be substantially
faster than that for the ERM method with the same hypothesis space H . The
choice of P(h) gives an additional degree of ﬂexibility in deﬁning a learning
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bias for the function LEARN WITHOUT CHANGING THE HYPOTHESIS SPACE H
AT ALL, and this bias can substantially increase the rate of convergence of the
method, if the values for P(h) are well chosen.
Similar methods can be used for inﬁnite hypothesis spaces. In this case we
again identify each h ∈ H with a vector of n real-valued parameters h1,...,hn.
Learning theory results for neural networks (Bartlett 1998) and support vector
machines (SVMs) (Cortes & Vapnik 1995) essentially suggest replacing the
factor −logP(h) with the quantity ∑
n
i=1h2
i , which is the Euclidean norm ||h||
2
of the vector h. The function LEARN again picks a hypothesis that minimizes
a combination of two terms, but in this case the second term is a function that
penalizes high values for ||h||
2.
A remarkable property of this method (at least for certain hypothesis spaces,
such as SVMs or neural networks) is that the number of training examples
required is linear in ||h||
2, but is otherwise INDEPENDENT OF THE NUMBER
OF PARAMETERS n. This method thus takes advantage of distributional bias in
such a way that it is the LIKELIHOOD of the hypothesis (as deﬁned by ||h||
2) that
determines the difﬁculty of learning it, not the complexity of its representation.
5.5 PAC/VC learnability and distributions on training samples
While imposing a prior distributional bias on H can improve convergence
rates in PAC/VC learning, it does not address an important limitation of this
framework with respect to natural-language grammar induction.17 Nowak et al.
(2002) point out that the set of ﬁnite and the set of regular languages are not
PAC/VC learnable due to the fact that they have inﬁnite VC-dimension. This
result follows straightforwardly for both cases. For the set of ﬁnite languages,
all possible assignments of Boolean values to the members of any sample set of
k strings (1 for membership in the language and 0 for exclusion) will be covered
by elements of the set of ﬁnite sets of strings. Hence any ﬁnite sample string is
shattered by the elements of H for ﬁnite languages. Similarly, if H consists of
the inﬁnite set of possible Finite State Automata (equivalently, the set of Finite
State Grammars), then any sample set of regular strings will be shattered by
members of H . Therefore, the set of ﬁnite languages and the set of regular
languages are not PAC/VC learnable. At ﬁrst blush, this may seem surprising,
but with so few constraints from the hypothesis space, generalization is simply
impossible.
A possible solution to this difﬁculty is to impose an upper bound on the size
of ﬁnite languages and on the number of states in a possible FSA (rules in a
possible FSG). Nowak et al. (2002) observe that for any speciﬁed value n, the set
of ﬁnite languages of size n and the set of regular languages generated by FSAs
with n states (FSGs with n rules) have ﬁnite VC dimension and so are PAC/VC
learnable. In fact, Shinohara (1994) shows that the set of languages generated by
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context-sensitive grammars with n productions is learnable in the limit in Gold’s
sense.18
We can even choose the bound as an appropriate function of the number
of training examples. In a framework in which we attempt to converge on a
hypothesis as the number of training examples grows, this allows convergence
in the limit for arbitrary languages from these otherwise problematic classes.
A similar effect can be obtained by placing a prior probability over the bound,
effectively a prior on the size of the grammar.
Another natural way of dealing with this problem is to impose constraints on
the distribution of the samples to which the learner is exposed. On this view
the data available to a learner exhibits a distributional pattern determined by
a grammar. Although the samples to which a learner is exposed are randomly
selected, they are taken from a particular probability distribution on the strings of
the target language. Clark & Thollard (2004) propose a distributional sample bias
for PAC learning of regular languages. They show that if the data string distribu-
tions for regular languages are determined by probabilistic FSA’s corresponding
to the target grammars that generate these languages, then the set of regular
languages is PAC learnable. It seems reasonable to generalize this approach to
other types of grammars, like context free grammars (CFGs) and (mildly) context
sensitive grammars (CSGs).19 We would obtain the distributions on the training
data necessary to render the sets of languages corresponding to these grammars
PAC learnable, from probabilistic versions of the target grammars. The advantage
of this approach is that it achieves PAC learnability not by imposing an arbitrary
cardinality restriction on the number of rules in the grammars of H , but through
constraints on possible distributions of the training samples that bear a direct
relation to the grammars that generate this data.
5.6 Discussion
While we have concentrated on the PAC/VC framework, online learning (Blum
1996) and Bayesian methods (Berger 1985) have many similarities. Online
learning does not make use of the assumption of a distribution D over training and
test examples, but nevertheless shares close connections with PAC/VC learning.
Bayesian methods do not make use of the frequentist style of analysis in the
PAC/VCapproach,butneverthelessshareseveralconcepts – forexample,theidea
of a hypothesis or parameter space; the idea of a distributional bias of members of
the hypothesis space; and the idea of a deﬁnition of LEARN that balances how well
ahypothesisﬁtsthetrainingdataagainstsomepriorprobabilityofthathypothesis.
We are by no means the ﬁrst authors to suggest that Gold’s framework is
problematic, or that other frameworks such as PAC/VC learning offer a preferable
alternative.Johnson(2004)discussesproblemswithGold’stheorem.Clark(2004)
also points out problems with some of the assumptions underlying Gold’s
approach when applied to grammar induction for natural languages. Nowak et al.
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(2002) consider the use of PAC/VC analysis instead of Gold’s framework; Poggio
et al. (2004) propose that the deﬁnition of LEARN can employ a distributional bias
that may be useful in language acquisition. Pereira (2000) makes the point that in
some cases inﬁnite hypothesis spaces may be learnable, whereas in some cases
ﬁnite hypothesis spaces are too complex. However, he discusses computational
complexity of learning, which we have not discussed here, concentrating instead
on complexity in terms of the number of training examples required. Niyogi
(2006) provides an excellent source for theory in this area.
We are also not the ﬁrst to note that sample complexity (the number of samples
required for effective learning) is an important issue. Several authors have argued
for learning mechanisms within particular (typically strong-bias) theories on the
basis of low sample complexity, at least informally construed. The work of Niyogi
& Berwick (1996) and Niyogi (2006) is a central example; this work and related
efforts are important for addressing questions of plausibility of P&P models from
a learning perspective. We merely point out that strong bias is neither necessary
nor sufﬁcient for low sample complexity.
Most importantly, PAC/VC learning, online learning, and Bayesian methods
all have a very clear notion of learning bias, which is instantiated within the
choices of H and LEARN. Indeed, results concerning convergence in the limit,
or rate of convergence, give strong evidence for the need for such a bias, and the
relationship between the character of this bias and the feasibility of learning. This
runs counter to the perception – which in our view is misguided – that ‘statistical’
or ‘empiricist’ approaches to learning do not employ bias.
6. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PARAMETERS IN GRAMMAR
There are important distinctions between the notion of parameter invoked within
the P&P view of grammar and the one employed to specify probabilistic language
models. It is useful to identify these differences and consider their implications
for the issues that we are addressing here.
6.1 Parameters in a P&P theory of UG
Within the P&P framework a parameter is an underspeciﬁed element within one
of the conditions that deﬁnes UG. Advocates of this framework argue that param-
eterized principles of UG provide an effective formal mechanism for explaining
both the facts of language acquisition and of language variation. We have already
addressed the problematic nature of the claim that a small number of parameters
is necessitated by learnability considerations. Another advantage claimed for this
approach is the possibility of organizing parameters in implicational relations that
permit one to express observed dependencies of grammatical properties across
languages. So, for example, a positive value for the pro drop parameter is taken to
imply selection of rich verbal agreement morphology.
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It is important to note that this approach seeks to maximize the mutual depen-
dence of parameters through a subsumption relation that supports type inference.
One would expect proponents of this framework to develop detailed proposals for
parameter hierarchies that specify the type structure which constitutes the core of
UG. In fact, as Newmeyer (2004) observes, after twenty-ﬁve years of work within
the P&P framework the only instance of such a parametric type system that has
been suggested to date is Baker’s (2001) parameter hierarchy (PH).
Newmeyer shows that the typological predictions that PH makes are incorrect
for a large class of cases. So, for example, PH entails that head-ﬁnal languages
exhibit morphological case marking. However, 36% of such languages do not
have case, while signiﬁcant percentages of non-head-ﬁnal languages do (42% of
V-initial and 30% of V-medial languages). Newmeyer also shows that arguments
for clustering of properties within a language due to a particular parameter
setting do not, in general, hold. He illustrates this claim with a systematic
study of the relation between null subjects, subject inversion, and THAT-trace
violations, which indicates that none of the purported clustering effects among
these phenomena are sustained cross-linguistically.
The potential explanatory signiﬁcance of parameters has been signiﬁcantly
weakened by their recent relocation from general principles and constraints of
grammar to lexical items, speciﬁcally functional heads, within the minimalist
program (Chomsky 1995) version of the P&P project. As Newmeyer points out,
on this view parametric values are set not for an entire language but for individual
lexical items and categories. Lexical parameters become a descriptive device for
capturing the facts of word order (and other phenomena) on virtually a language
by language basis. They have little if any predictive content.20.
Newmeyer argues that a rule-based theory of UG is a better alternative to the
P&P framework. Rules are required in addition to parameters in a P&P theory
in any case, and parameters are, when correctly formulated, fully equivalent to
alternative rules of a particular kind.21
He concludes that discarding parameters in UG has no direct bearing on the
issue of innateness. This is clearly true, as prior to the emergence of the P&P
approach of Chomsky (1981), Chomsky (1965) described UG as the schema of a
grammar that deﬁnes the set of possible rules for each component of the grammar.
However, giving up the P&P framework seriously undermines the advantages
that its advocates have claimed for a rich theory of UG as the basis for an
explanation of language acquisition, as well as an account of language variation.
Speciﬁcally, language acquisition can no longer be reduced to the process of
selecting among a small number of possible values for a ﬁnite set of parameters.
Instead, a separate learning theory is required to explain how a schema of
grammar can provide the basis for extracting a particular grammar from linguistic
data. The probabilistic language models that ML employs can, in principle, ﬁll
this gap. But then the burden of innateness claims falls upon the learning theory
that ML provides. To the extent that a weak-bias model of the sort that we have
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been suggesting is adequate to derive the observed facts of grammar, the task-
speciﬁc content of UG becomes correspondingly minimal.
6.2 Parameters in probabilistic language models
In contrast to the P&P view of UG, probabilistic language models used in
the natural-language engineering community tend to minimize the number of
parameters and to maximize their relative independence in order to facilitate
the computation of the model. Moreover, these parameters specify the basic
elements of underlying structure in the data, rather than underspeciﬁed features
of principles that make up a grammar.
Consider, for example, a simple non-lexicalized probabilistic context free
grammar G of the sort brieﬂy sketched in 4.1. We take G as a model of
the language L (as described, for example, by Jurafsky & Martin (2000)). Its
parameters are (N,T,P,S,D), where N is the set of non-terminal symbols, T is
the set of terminals (the lexicon), S is the start symbol of G (corresponding to
the root node of a sentence), R is the set of productions (CFG rules), and D is a
function that assigns probabilities to the elements of R. When values are speciﬁed
for all of these parameters G provides a model of L that determines a probability
for every sentence s relative to the parses of s that G produces.
If we have a corpus of parse-annotated sentences of L that provides a gold
standard for the model, then we can set the parameters of G straightforwardly. N,
T, P, and S are extracted directly from the parse annotations, and the value of D
for each element A → β1...βk of R can be estimated by the MLE formula
c(A → β1...βk)
c(A → γ)
However, If we have only an unannotated corpus, then it is necessary to
estimate the values of the parameters of G. This involves using statistical learning
algorithms to identify structure in the data corresponding to each of the parame-
ters. The values of N (non-terminals) and T (terminals) of G can be identiﬁed by
unsupervised learning through clustering techniques. Once these parameters have
been speciﬁed, S and the elements of R are effectively given. It is then necessary
to estimate D by computing the possible parses of the sentences in the corpus
using a procedure like the inside-outside algorithm (as described, for example, by
Manning & Sch¨ utze (1999)).
Notice that while the parameters of G jointly deﬁne the search space for
constructing a grammar they do not have to be taken as irreducibly given, in
the sense that the sets of their possible values are pre-speciﬁed, as is the case
for the parameters of a UG within the P&P framework. The possible values for
parameters of a language model like G can be built up on the basis of antecedent
applicationsofprobabilisticlearningalgorithmsthatsupplymorebasicstructures.
The vocabulary of G can be obtained by unsupervised morphological learning
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(Goldsmith 2001, Schone & Jurafsky 2001). The pre-terminal lexical part of N
can be acquired by unsupervised POS tagging (Clark 2003). The remaining non-
terminals and the CFG rules can be identiﬁed through unsupervised grammar
induction techniques (Klein & Manning 2002, 2004). Each of the learning
algorithms used to obtain values for these parameters will in turn require a model
with parameters whose possible values are constrained in non-trivial ways. Some
of these parameters may be further reducible to structures supplied by more basic
unsupervised learning procedures.
7. CONCLUSION
Recent research on unsupervised machine learning of grammar offers support for
the view that knowledge of language can be achieved through general machine
learning methods with a minimal set of initial settings for possible linguistic
categories and rule hypotheses. This work also suggests a sequenced bootstrap
model of language learning in which each level of structure acquired provides the
input to a higher successor component of grammar. In at least some cases both
the basic categories and the hypothesis space might be derived from more general
cognitive processing patterns (like the binary branching trees and non-overlap
constraint that Klein and Manning use to bias their models).
Machinelearningexperimentsongrammarinduction,particularlythoseinvolv-
ing unsupervised learning, can contribute important insights into the necessary
conditions for language acquisition, at the least by vitiating poverty of stimulus
arguments. They do not, of course, show us anything about the processes that
human learners actually apply in acquiring natural language. This is the proper
concern of research in psychology and neuroscience. These experiments can,
however, demonstrate the viability of particular language models as learning
mechanisms. To the extent that the bias of a successful model is deﬁned by
a comparatively weak set of language-speciﬁc conditions, we can rely more
heavily on task-general machine learning methods to explain the possibility of
acquiring linguistic knowledge, in lieu of psychological evidence that supports an
alternative view.
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supporting his work there. The ﬁrst author’s research was supported by grant number RES-000-
23-0065 of the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom. Needless to say,
we bear sole responsibility for these ideas.
2 This use of the term BIAS has no pejorative import. Rather, it expresses the fact that the model
biases learning according to a priori expectations.
3 We take bias in this sense to be a feature of a learning algorithm, and we do not make any
assumptions that it is an innate, biologically determined property of human learners. We also
do not claim that learning algorithms that provide computationally viable procedures for grammar
induction correspond to psychological processing mechanisms. We treat the bias of a successful
learning algorithm as specifying a universal grammar only in the sense that it characterizes the
hypothesis space of learnable languages for that procedure.
4 Nonetheless, one sees expressions of the view that statistical learning methods are somehow faulty
for lacking any bias. For instance, ‘But a more serious problem with DDL [data-driven learning],
both present and future, has to do with the wild statistical disparities between what is presented
to children and how children actually learn. As pointed out by Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) and
others, a DDL model without innate knowledge, or learning priors, can do nothing but recapitulate
the statistical distributions of adult input. But children often learn their languages in ways that
clearly defy such distributions.’ (Legate & Yang 2002) In fact, without ‘learning priors’, not even
the statistical distribution can be recapitulated, any distribution being based on the structure of
its parameters. Without a learning prior, a learning method can merely recapitulate the training
data, without generalizing to a distribution, and even such recapitulation constitutes a bias (against
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generalization). The issue, of course, is whether the innate knowledge or learning prior is strong
or weak.
5 The range from weak to strong bias is, of course, a continuum, not a dichotomy. However, we
will continue to use the terms loosely to distinguish models that fall at the respective ends of the
spectrum.
6 We are limiting ourselves to parsing in order to go into some detail in clarifying the role of learning
bias in machine learning and language acquisition. There has been a great deal of work on the
application of machine learning methods to a wide variety of tasks in NLP in addition to parsing.
This work has achieved impressive results in the full spectrum of NL tasks, including areas like
speech recognition, morphological analysis, part of speech tagging, anaphora resolution, semantic
interpretation, domain theory identiﬁcation, discourse coherence, and dialogue interpretation. For
an overview of some of this work in the context of the issues we are discussing here see the
discussion by Lappin (2005).
7 Achieving wide coverage descriptive adequacy for the generalizations of a theory of grammar is,
in general, far more difﬁcult than is often assumed. Postal (2004) shows that many (perhaps most)
of the conditions and constraints that have been proposed at one time or another as elements of
UG admit of substantial counter-evidence.
8 The model might incorporate weak or strong bias, and the algorithm might be quite general
or highly task-speciﬁc, in theory. However, most work to date has proceeded conservatively
along these lines, adding biasing structure only grudgingly and using standard statistical learning
techniques, less for principled reasons than for algorithmic simplicity.
9 One must beware of simplistic conﬂations of fewer parameters, more bias, and easier learning. As
we point out in section 5, the situation is quite a bit more complex, and the ﬁeld of computational
learning theory has made signiﬁcant progress in formally capturing a notion of intrinsic difﬁculty
of learning of different hypothesis spaces, for instance through notions like VC dimension. In this
particular example, the two models (MLE bigram and class-based bigram) are sufﬁciently similar
and the disparity in number so large that a crude counting of the parameters is reasonable, but in
general more sophisticated analysis is necessary. Indeed, the characterization of intrinsic learning
complexity for hypothesis spaces is one of the insights of computational learning theory that is of
potential value to linguistic theory; we review it in section 5.
10 In particular, we report values of the F1-measure here, in which precision and recall are equally
weighted.
11 Some critics of the view that machine learning can provide a viable model of human grammar
acquisition have argued that an ML system learns only from a corpus of grammatical sentences and
so is limited to recognizing well-formed phrases. See, for example, Carson Schutze’s contributions
of April 20 and May 5, 2005, on the LINGUIST LIST, to the discussion of Richard Sproat and
Shalom Lappin, ‘A Challenge to the Minimalist Community’, LINGUIST LIST, April 5, 2005. This
claim is misconceived. The parser that an ML system produces can be engineered as a classiﬁer
to distinguish grammatical and ungrammatical strings, and it can identify the structures assigned
to a string under which this distinction holds. Such a classiﬁer can also be reﬁned to provide
error messages that identify those properties of an unsuccessful parse that cause a sentence to be
identiﬁed as ungrammatical.
12 More formally, for any member h of H , we deﬁne ERROR(h) to be the probability that h makes
an error on a randomly drawn example from the distribution D. Deﬁne L∗ to be the lowest value of
ERROR(h) for any member of H . We would like LEARN to return a member of H whose value
for ERROR(h) is as close to L∗ as possible. Under these deﬁnitions, (ε,δ)–convergence means that
withprobabilityatleast1−δ thehypothesisreturnedby LEARN willhave ERROR(h)≤L∗+ε.The
statement ‘with probability at least 1−δ’ refers to probability with respect to the random choice
of training examples from D. Intuitively, this statement means that there is a small probability δ,
that the training sample will be a ‘bad’ one where LEARN fails to return a good member of H .
13 To be exact, results from PAC learning suggest that at most m=
log|H |−logδ
ε2 training examples are
required for (ε,δ)–convergence for any ﬁnite hypothesis space H .
33S. LAPPIN & S. M. SHIEBER
14 We assume here that the function to be learned has a range of 2, that is, it assigns a single bit to
each input.
15 As an exercise, the reader might want to verify that a ‘northeast’ hypothesis space, which labels
points as 1s only in the northeast quadrant, has VC-dimension of 1.
16 As one example of minimizing both of these factors, LEARN might return the member of H that
minimizes
ERROR0(h)+
r
−logP(h)
m
where m is the number of training examples.
17 We are grateful to Alex Clark for invaluable discussion and advice on the issues dealt with in this
section.
18 Scholz & Pullum (2002) cite Shinohara’s result to support their claim that natural-language
grammars are learnable even within the narrow strictures of Gold’s learning theory, given a
sufﬁciently large upper bound on the number of rules in the set of possible CSGs for natural
languages.
19 See Clark (2006) for an application of this approach to a particular subclass of CFGs, the class
corresponding to the non-terminally separated languages.
20 This point is also argued by Johnson & Lappin (1999: 83-84) and Bouchard (2005).
21 Roberts & Holmberg (2005) challenge Newmeyer’s critique by citing evidence of parametric clus-
tering in several Scandinavian languages. Newmeyer (2006) responds to these claims effectively
by pointing out that (i) the data can be as easily accommodated on a rule-based account, and,
more seriously, (ii) the parameters that Roberts and Holmberg propose do not generalize across
genetically unrelated languages.
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